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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This matter involves a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA” or “Agreement”) for the

sale of property located on Federal Way in Boise, Ada County, Idaho (the “Property”). Citadel
is the owner of the Property, and Plaintiff River Range LLC (“River Range” or “Buyer”) was the
Buyer. After the due diligence period under the PSA expired, the sale nevertheless did not go
through. The dispute between the parties centers on whether River Range, as Buyer, still has a
right to have an “Earnest Money” deposit under the PSA refunded. River Range claims such a
right despite non-refundable language in the PSA and written instructions given by River Range
for the release of the deposit to Seller. River Range raises two arguments, (1) a claim of
ambiguity in the contract language; and (2) a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
The bottom line, however, is that the PSA in this case ended up including plain,
unambiguous language that said the earnest money deposit was released to Citadel and became
non-refundable on at a certain date and time. The key non-refundable earnest money language
was specifically drafted for this transaction in an addendum to what otherwise were Realtor
promulgated form type documents. River Range even sent instruction to the escrow agent to
“release” the earnest money deposit to the Seller at the time that Buyer’s due diligence period
elapsed. Now River Range is trying to use form language related to the title commitment to
claim an ambiguity or other reason why a refund of the “released” earnest money deposit could
occur after the due diligence deadline—despite the plain language indicating that if Seller lets the
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deal go on after the due diligence deadline "for any reason", then the earnest money deposit
would be released and not returned.
On the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, River Range is seeking to have
duties imposed on Citadel in excess of those expressly spelled out in the contract. There was no
duty to make title marketable here and there was no duty to cooperate, the state of title was on a
take it or leave it basis. Thus, there is no violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The answer the District Court gave to River Range here is the right one. A deal is a deal.
And the written documentation for this approximately $7,000,000 deal between sophisticated
commercial parties plainly provided that the $50,000 earnest money deposit (approximately
.072% of the purchase price) went hard-i.e., was released, no exceptions, carve outs, or fingerscrossed-behind-our back aspect-on a date certain. There were no exceptions allowed for or
agreed upon.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Appellant's Complaint seeking return of the earnest money was filed on June 20, 2018. 1
After the initial pleadings, Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
documentation on November 8, 2018, 2 asserting that language contained in Addendum No. 2
made the Ernest Money deposit non-refundable and that River Range had acted in writing to
release and waive any right to refund of the Earnest Money deposit.

1
2

R. 000006-10.
R. 0000018-115.
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The Court denied an

I.R.C.P. 56(d) motion filed by Appellant3 and, after all the briefing was submitted, heard oral
argument on Appellant's Motion for Summary on January 15, 2019. On April 15, 2019, the
Court granted Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on Idaho contract law and the
unambiguous terms of the PSA between the parties. This Appeal followed.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

At all relevant times hereto, Citadel is the owner of certain real property located at

2851 South Federal Way, Boise, Ada County, Idaho 83705 ("Property"), which was a storage
unit facility. 4
2.

On approximately January 22, 2018, River Range made a $6,725,000.00 offer to

Citadel to purchase the Property by issuing a filled out RE-23 Commercial/Investment Real
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, executed by Tim Viole on behalf of River Range. The
original

offer

utilized

an

Idaho

Realtor's®

form-type

agreement,

an

RE-23

Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. Specifically, the July 2017

3

R. 0000146. The Court heard oral argument for and against this I.R.C.P. 56(d) motion in
conjunction with the summary judgment argument on January 15, 2019, TR. 4; 1. 15 to 5, 1. 13;
74; 11. 10-24, and implicitly denied it by proceeding to decide the pending summary judgment
motion. No issue on appeal has been raised by any party with respect to the disposition of the
I.R.C.P. 56(d) Motion, and it is the position of Respondent that any argument regarding the
I.R.C.P. 56(d) Motion has now been waived on appeal. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 108,
982 P.2d 940, 943 (1999)("The failure to include the waiver issue in their statement of issues or
address the issue in their opening brief eliminates consideration of it on appeal.") (citations
omitted).
4
R. 00047, ,I 3.
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Edition promulgated by the Idaho Association of Realtors (the "Original RE-23 Form PSA") was
used. 5
3.

Along with the Original RE-23 Form PSA, Plaintiffs offer at the time it was

made also included Addendum # 1, which was a Price Escalation Addendum to Purchase and
Sale Agreement ("Addendum No. 1") and unlike the RE-23 Form, all of the language on this
document appears to have been typed specifically for this transaction. 6
4.

The Original RE-23 Form PSA offer included a provision concerning the Earnest

Money. 7 River Range, as Buyer, caused that form to be filled out as part of its offer. River
Range used form language and simply checked boxes and filled in the amount of $100,000.00 in
Earnest Money to be deposited into a trust account and held by the closing agency, TitleOne,
until closing of the sale. At closing, the Earnest Money was to be applied to the purchase price.
The following is an image taken verbatim from the form illustrating what was filled in on
Section 4 of that RE-23:
llD

21

4, EARNEST MONEY. BUYERhefe~yOffers

100000

DOLlARS as esmest. Money in the

38

follO!Mllg form: De.ash Dlpersollal thee Ocashtet"~ di~. □note (due da e);,________~ - - - - -

11

Cother

:n

Eern&1t Money wilhln._ _ _ bus 1185$ da~ Clhree [~ If left b_ank) r:I acceptance.
Earnes;I Mooe)' to be depos ed In ws.\ accoun CJupon H~lp •or :mupm aa;aiptance by BUYER and SELLER or l[]olhe.r__ _ _ _ _ ____,.
=--:----::---------------------'end
shall be held by. □Us ng Broker
Closlng Agency
□other._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.fortne benefl! of Iha pat1res ,har:t o.
Ut\tes, ~lhtl'Viise 89fffd to fll 'llffllk'lg, lhe Earnest Mooay shall be appfieabl6 to lh& ptirchase price.
THE RESPORSfBLE BROKER SHALL BE:
Ma:ck Bott.les

»

M

_ _

5

R. 000047; R. 000051-63; R. 00043.
R. 00004 7; R. 000065.
7
R. 000051.
6
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and □recelpl Is hereby acim~dged OR

II

BUYER VAIi •h&t

5.

The next mention of the $100,000.00 Earnest Money was in the next paragraph,

Section 5 of that form Original RE-23 Form PSA, and was actually specifically typed into that
form for this transaction. Section 5 said that there was to be a “Due Diligence Period,” that the
Earnest Money would “remain fully refundable” during that period, but that after that
contingency expired, “Earnest Money to become non-refundable, but to remain applicable to the
Purchase Price, though $50,000 shall be released to Seller.”
6.

The other material mentions of Earnest Money in the Original RE-23 Form PSA

offer was more form language, not specifically drafted for this transaction, which specified:
[Section 12]:
{A}. PRl!LIMINARY TITL6 COMMITMENT: No later than the Seller Disclosure DtsdUne, SELLER ahall fumlsh to BUYER. at SELLER'a sole cos\ end
expenae, a prellmlna,y convnltmenl of a llUo lnsuranea pollcy ahc>YMg the e<>ndlllcn ol lha dtle to aald PROPERTY, logelher With • copy of each
lnstrumanl, 1greem1nl or dOCUtNnl hied as an exception to liUa In the title commitment thal Is reasonably avanable to SELLER. BUYER shan have
flllotn (16) business days from receipt of th& p,elimlnary commitment within which 10 object In wrillng to lh8 condilion of the title u sel forth In the
preliminary commitment If BUYER does n~ ,o obj&C(, BUYER ehall be deemed to have accepted the condlUons of tho tiUo. It Is agreed that II the lll/e ol
said PROPERTY Is not marketabla, or cannot be made so l'llthln ten (10) business days after n~fce contalnlng a written statement°' delecl Is denvored
lo SELLER, then BUYER, at BVYER's opUon, may either. (a) terminate this egreemenl by written notlOe to the SELLER, In which BUYER'S Eatnest
M°"8y deposll 1hal be returned to BUYER and neither party shaft have any further ril)hta, ot,ngatJons or liablliUes exCG1>l as expros.sly set forth In this
Agreement; or (b) continue ¥<1th lhla Agreement and, If closing occurs, aocopt talO eubject to tho uncured title delecte Olher than monolary flans. SELLER
cov11nants and a9rees that all moMlary Mens •hel bo removed by SELLER al closing or lnsurod against by thG tide Insurer, whether or not BUYER haa
designaled euch monecery fiens as UUe dofecls.

[Section 16]:
---·· · · --·- -··

(A}. BUYER's obligations under this Agreement Ole conditioned upon BVYER's satisfaction, In BUYER's sole disaeUon, concerning all aspects or the
1e11$!1llilY of lhe PROPERTY for BUYER's intended purpose. This shall indude, but Is not limited to: the contraels and leases affecting the
PROPERTY: lhe polenlial financial performance of the PROPERrY: the availabmty of government pennits and approvals; and lhe outcome Q( any
app,atsals ilnd lender underMlting. This conllngency shall be d.,med waived unless BUYER gives written nollce to SELLER on or before the Due
Diligence Deadline that tho PROPERTY Is until /or BlJYER's rntended l)\Kpose. If such nollce Ii given, tho Eat1141SI Mon&y ~hall be relunded lo
BUYER

[Section 17]:
(S}. SATISFACTION/REMOVAL oi: INSPECTION ou·e DILIGENCE CONTINGENCIES:
(1). If BUYER, In SUYER's sole discretion, determines that the re$ults al the BUYER'S due diligence ere not acceptable, then BUYER, no ,~tor
IMn Ille Due O~lgence o.adl1ne, wU ellh8': (II) can<lel lhl, Agreement povld,ng wtiUon notice to SEU.ER. in which event the Earnest Money de:>osit
shall b& rewrned to BUYER: or (b) pro·liding lO SELLER a written notice seninglorth BUVER'i; disapproved items.
{2). If BUYER dote not wlflin the sttlct lime period specllled take either of the ections staled in Section 17(8)(1), OUYER ,haU conclusivelv be
deemed to have: (a) completed all Inspections, investigations, rolliew of a1>pUcable documents ond disclosures; (b} elected to 1>roceed with the
transacuon; (c) aisumed au liobility, responsbility and eirponse for repairs or correc.tiom other than ro, items Whieh SELLER ha, oUlerwi38 eg,eed
ln writiii11 lo repair or correcl; and (d) unlOS$ another condition or contingency HI 10111'11n an Adtlendum or Counietoffet remains unsall.$fi0d, the
E&1nest Money dllposij shall become nonref111dable eXC$PI upon an IM>lance of SELLER's default.
{3). If BUYER lime., p(Ovides notice Of dl&.lppcoved items lo SELLER, BUYER and SELLER shalt have fivo (5} business days after SELLER'S
receipt of tne notice of disepp10,,tcJ Items In whldl 10 "ll'OO in "rifng upon lht manner Ill r•wlwip lhe cJi59pproved KCills. If DUYER and SELLER
havo not ograod In wrl!ng upon lh& manner or rMOl11U19 tna dlsa11provetl Item, by I'- dea.dltle. BUYER may cancel this Aorcemtnl by doffY9Mg
Wtltcn nolice 10 SELLER no llller tt,en Mteer, (15) deys affot SELLER'• r ~ OI lie ~ o Of O,epp(OV8d Items; WhetouPon the Eam11$1 Money
deposit shall be relumed to BUYER and neith<tr l)atly shall h8ve any fmllet rights or ~•gst,on, ~,lier thb A!1&e,'nenl. u BUYER doos not elvo cuch
w rillen nolico ol cancold.lon within !he lllrict 1me perlexls 5')9Cifoed, BUYf::R shall conclu$ivel)' 11e deemed lo have elected to p,ocee4 v,111 tho
trans.,.ction wilhout re1>airsor Cllll~ctions other than for items which SELLER llas otherwise agreed in writing to rei>ar or correct and lhe 1:amesl Money
depoSllShall become nonrefundable fl)C&pl uPon an instince of SELLER'S delaull
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[Section 29]:
29, OEFAULT: If BUVER default§ In lht peiformance or lhts Agreement, SELLER &haH be entitled, 21s SELLER's $Ole end exclusive Nimedy, to
terminals lhis Agreement bywritti!n notice lo Iha BUYER, In which even! Iha Eamest Monell' deposit &ha1 be paid lo ~tLER as llq'Jlclated damages.

7.

On January 23, 2018, Citadel responded to the offer with a proposed Addendum

No. 2. That Addendum No. 2, along with the Original RE-23 Form PSA and Addendum No. 1
offer, were executed by Mr. Centers on behalf of Citadel on January 23, 2018, and by Tim Viole
on behalf of River Range on January 24, 2018, and together became the parties' contract
(throughout this brief, the Original RE-23 Form PSA, Addendum No. 1, and Addendum No. 2
are collectively referred to as the "PSA" or "Agreement"). 8
8.

Most notably, Addendum No. 2 increased the purchase price to $6,915,000.00.

But Addendum No. 2 also introduced a number of other deal terms relative to the Earnest Money
deposit and critical to understanding why the District Court's decision in this case should stand
as written.
9.

Addendum No. 2 was drafted by attorney Frank Lee, a partner with Givens

Pursley LLP. Although to the uninitiated observer it might appear to have a style and font
similar to the Original RE-23 Form PSA offer, in fact, no part of Addendum No. 2 was a form
document. Addendum No. 2 in its entirety was written to materially change multiple sections of
the Original RE-23 Form PSA offer in ways specific to this transaction. 9 Addendum No. 2
stated, in part, "To the extent that the terms of this Addendum modify or conflict with any
provisions of the foregoing Agreement, including all prior addendums or counteroffers, the terms

8
9

R. 000047, 16; R. 000067-71.
R. 000043, 13.
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of this Addendum will control. All terms of the foregoing agreement not modified by this
Addendum will remain unchanged." Addendum No. 2 then completely deleted the operative
language of the Original RE-23 Form PSA offer in Sections 4 and 5 with respect to Earnest
Money.
10.

Under Addendum No. 2, Section 4, the amount of Earnest Money was reduced to

$50,000.00 from $100,000, was to be a "deposit" with the title company, and was to be:
fully refundable to Buyer until the Due Diligence Deadline. The
Earnest Money will become nonrefundable if Buyer's failure [sic
"Buyer fails"] to terminate this Agreement by the Due Diligence
Deadline for any reason, and in such event, Buyer will then
promptly authorize Title Company to release the Earnest Money to
Seller. 10
11.

Notably, with respect to a default by Seller, Addendum No. 2 eliminated the form

language of Section 29 of the Original RE-23 Form PSA offer, which had provided that the
Buyer did not waive any lawful right or remedy for Seller's default, to instead limit the rights of
Buyer on default to repayment of certain expenses as well as a return of the Earnest Money
deposit:
If SELLER defaults, having approved said sale and fails to
consummate the same as agreed herein, BUYER' s Earnest Money
deposit shall be returned to him/her and SELLER shall pay for the
costs of title insurance, escrow fees, credit report fees, inspection
fees, Brokerage fees and attorney's fees, if any. The preceding
sentence will be BUYER's sole and exclusive remedy for
SELLER' s failure to consummate the sale as herein agreed.

10

R. 000047, ,r 6; R. 000067-71.
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12.

Buyer filed the Complaint on June 20, 2018. Thus, pursuant to the Agreement,

Buyer's "sole and exclusive" remedy for failure to consummate the sale by Seller (assuming
Buyer proves breach by Seller) is limited to the return of the Earnest Money deposit and some
other expenses-none of which were sought by the Complaint. Addendum No. 2's modification
of Section 29 does not include general damages or specific performance-i. e., there is no right of
the Buyer to compel sale on any terms. 11
13.

Addendum No. 2 also specifically added an "AS-IS" provision to Section 17,

stating that the Buyer acknowledged it was "acquiring the Property in its current condition, as is,
where is, in reliance solely on Buyer's own inspections and ... not in reliance on any statement,
representation, warranty, promise or agreement of any kind whatsoever by Seller, any broker or
agent or representative of either." 12
14.

Addendum No. 2 also discussed the quality of deed to be conveyed, replacing

language to this effect in Section 2 of the Original RE-23 Form PSA offer, with the following:
Title of SELLER is to be conveyed by customary special warranty
deed conveying all of Seller's right, title and interest in the
Property free and clear of any encumbrances arising by or through
Seller except real property taxes and assessments not yet due and
payable.
15.

Essentially, this change called for a statutory "grant deed" in place of a full

"warranty deed." See Idaho Code § 55-612.

11
12

R. 000068.
R. 000047, 16; R. 000067-71.
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16.

The Earnest Money deposit in the amount of $50,000 was subsequently deposited

by River Range into local title and escrow company TitleOne. 13
17.

The "Seller Disclosure Deadline" was January 29, 2018; 14 however, a title

insurance commitment was not provided until February 16, 2018. 15
18.

River Range evidently realized that this meant that the 15 days afforded to River

Range to object to the Title Commitment under Section 12(A) would run past the Due Diligence
Deadline specified in Addendum No. 2 of February 21, 2018, as on that date, River Range
proposed an Addendum No. 3 to the Agreement that purported to waive the Due Diligence
contingency subject to "a single reservation" that:
BUYER shall cause an ALTA Survey to be completed at Buyer's
expense, and should the new ALA Survey or any new Title
Exception that may arise disclose information that was not
contained in the provided ALTA Survey or Title Commitment,
Section 12 of the PSA shall govern these items, if any, which
Buyer was not aware of. In this event, and only this event, Buyer
retains the protections of Section 12. 16
19.

Citadel refused to sign this proposed Addendum No. 3. 17

20.

Thereafter, by means of a February 22, 2018 letter to Tara Clifford and Tami

Taylor of TitleOne Corporation, River Range expressly "waive[d] Due Diligence as per the Real
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) and Addenda, dated January 24th, 2018," and

13

R.
R.
15
R.
16
R.
17
R.
14

000007, ,r 7.
000067-71.
000008, ,r 12.
000047, ,r 7; R. 000073.
000047, ,r 7.
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"authorize[ d] the Title Company to release the Earnest Money deposit in the amount of
$50,000 to Seller." 18
21.

On February 23, 2018, River Range formally withdrew its proposed Addendum

No. 3, even though Citadel had already verbally rejected it. 19
22.

The Earnest Money deposit was released to Citadel in accordance with River

Range's instructions in the letter. 20
23.

Thereafter, Plaintiff objected in writing to the title insurance commitment ("Title

Insurance Objections") on March 12, 2018. 21 On March 16, 2018, Citadel responded to the Title
Insurance Objections by means of an email. 22
24.

On March 26, 2018, River Range purported to terminate the Agreement pursuant

to paragraph 12 and demanded the return of its Earnest Money. 23
25.

On April 6, 2018 Jake Centers of Citadel indicated in an email that he would be

delivering the Earnest Money check back to TitleOne, but no such return of the Earnest Money
occurred. 24
26.

On April 9, 2018, Bob Sumpter, a representative of River Range, sent an email to

River Range, among others, indicating that he had just met with Seller's counsel and that he
thought that Citadel would cooperate with River Range to get issues resolved before closing. 25
18

R.
R.
20
R.
21
R.
22
R.
23
R.
24
R.
19

000089, ,r 2; R. 000093; see also R. 000007, ,r 9 (emphasis added).
000089, ,r 3; R. 000095-100.
000047, ,r 8.
000047, 19; R. 000075-77.
00004 7, ,r 10, R. 000079-81.
000089, ,r 4; R. 000102.
000048, ,r 12; R. 000085.
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27.

Also on April 9, 2018, Citadel sent a letter to River Range indicating that, in its

view, the Agreement was still in effect. 26
28.

On April 10, 2018, River Range sent a letter to their agent disagreeing that the

Agreement was still in effect and suggesting terms for "reinstatement" of the Agreement. 27
29.

On April 17, 2018, River Range demanded the return of the Earnest Money

deposit by April 20, 2018. 28
30.

On April 20, 2018, counsel for Citadel responded to River Range's demand,

refusing to return the Earnest Money. 29
31.

On May 11, 2018, counsel for River Range wrote to counsel for Citadel, again

demanding return of the Earnest Money. 30
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Whether by sending proposed and rejected Addendum No. 3 and then giving
express direction to release the earnest money deposit to Seller Citadel, Buyer
River Range expressly waived due diligence and released the Earnest Money
deposit, thereby providing alternative grounds to sustain the District Judge's
decision.

B.

Whether Respondent should receive an award of attorney's fees and costs on
appeal. 31

R. 000089, ,r 5; R. 000104.
R. 000048, ,r 13; R. 000087.
27
R. 000090, ,r 6; R. 000106.
28
R. 000090, ,r 7; R. 000108.
29
R. 000090, ,r 8; R. 000110-111.
30
R. 000090, 19; R. 000113-115.
31
By raising the issue of attorney fees, Respondent simply seeks said fees if this Court finds it
appropriate under law to award them; neither the fact of seeking such fees or any other action of
Respondent should be construed as an admission on the part of Respondent that such fees are
appropriate.
25

26
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III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)-( e), Respondent requests appellate attorney fees and costs and
will present its argument on the issue of the same supported by citation to authorities, statutes,
and the record in Section IV herein.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

"This Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as the trial
court." Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 170, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015). "Summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). "Summary
judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact as to causation and damages." J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford,
146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P.3d 858, 864 (2008) (quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396,
64 P.3d 317, 322 (2003)). With respect to a case involving application of the law of another
state, this Court has noted:
Idaho appellate standards of review apply even when a contract's choice of law
provision requires the application of the law of another state. In reviewing a grant
of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the district
court's standard in ruling upon a motion.
Harmon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 162 Idaho 94, 98, 394 P.3d 796, 800 (2017) (citations

omitted). Further, a district court decision may be upheld on "alternate grounds from those
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stated in the findings of fact and conclusions of law on appeal." Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho
451,453, 65 P.3d 192, 194 (2003) (citations omitted).
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the PSA Is Not Ambiguous.
River Range argues that the District Court erred in finding that the Agreement was

unambiguous.

River Range argues that the PSA is ambiguous because paragraph 3 of

Addendum No. 2 (a new Section 4 containing the non-refundable provision) can be consistently
read with Section 12 of the PSA (alleged right to receive earnest money deposit back if Buyer
rejects state of title). 32 River Range's argument in this respect appears to be two-fold. First, that
by setting out what paragraphs Addendum No. 2 was trying to change at the beginning of each
such paragraph, Addendum No. 2 failed to modify Section 12 because there was no specific
paragraph of Addendum No. 2 that expressly purported to modify Section 12. Therefore, so goes
the argument, paragraph 12 was not modified and remained in full force and effect.

As a

corollary to this attempt to find an ambiguity, River Range also contends that Section 4 of the
PSA, which undisputedly was modified by Addendum No. 2, is a more general due diligence
provision and that Section 12 is specific to a title commitment aspect of due diligence and
therefore Section 12 controls over the general provisions, found in paragraph 3, Section 4 of
Addendum No. 2. 33 Both such arguments are not well taken.
River Range's attempt to argue ambiguity merely distorts the plain meaning of the cited
provisions of Addendum No. 2 and does not succeed in illuminating an ambiguity. Cf Farmers

32
33

See Appellant's Opening Brief (hereinafter "Opening Brief') at pp. 9-10.
Opening Brief, 11.
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National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014)
(indicating that with respect to statutes, "ambiguity is not established merely because different
possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the
subject of litigation could be considered ambiguous. . . . [A] statute is not ambiguous merely
because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it.") (citations omitted)
(ellipses and brackets in original).
The District Court's analysis on this point is crystal clear, compelling, and cannot really
be improved upon by additional oral argument. 34 Judge Baskin began by correctly citing that the
Idaho legislature has given courts discretion on how to construe potentially conflicting contract
provisions in situations where the parties began with a form and then typed in and handwrote in
information, citing Idaho Code Section § 29-109. That provision provides, in pertinent part:
Where a contract is partly written and partly printed, or where part
of it is written or printed under the special directions of the parties,
and with a special view to their intention, and the remainder is
copied from a form originally prepared without special reference to
the particular parties and the particular contract in question, the
written parts control the printed parts, and the parts which are
purely original control those which are copied from a form, and if
the two are absolutely repugnant, the latter must be so far
disregarded.
Idaho Code§ 29-109. Judge Baskin then went on to state that:
While it is true Addendum No. 2 did not specifically modify
Section 12 of the initial standard form contract, the language of the
Addendum No. 2 clearly put River Range on notice that conflicts

34

R. 000220-000223.
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with the initial contract and Addendum No. 2 are controlled by
Addendum No. 2 (not the language in the initial form contract). 35
The specific language of Addendum No. 2 to which Judge Baskin was referring goes one step
further than Section 29-109. It provides that in the event that any of the terms of Addendum No.
2 "modify or conflict with any provisions of the foregoing Agreement including all prior
addendums or counteroffers, the terms of this Addendum will control." 36 This opens the way for
the direction of 29-109 and the more specific language of the parties' agreement for para. 3 of
Addendum No. 2 to operate to make the non-refundability of earnest money on the date certain
of the Due Diligence Deadline absolute, as that specifically crafted language in Addendum No. 2
supplanting Section 4 says:
The Earnest Money is fully refundable to Buyer until the Due
Diligence Deadline.
The Earnest Money will become
nonrefundable if Buyer's failure [sic Buyer fails] to terminate this
agreement by the Due Diligence Deadline for any reason, and in
such event, Buyer will then promptly authorize the Title Company
to release the Earnest Money to Seller. The Earnest Money will be
applicable to the Purchase Price. 37
It is this "for any reason" language that was specifically drafted in Addendum No. 2 and that

conflicts with any other pre-existing language in the form document or the prior original PSA.
This "for any reason" language, combined with the directive of Idaho Code Section 29-109 and
the other language of Addendum No. 2 in terms of reconciling conflicts, removes any ambiguity
as to what to do in interpreting the PSA and makes the plain meaning of the document clear.

35

R. 000220.
R. 000218 (emphasis added).
37
R. 000217 (emphasis added).
36
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Indeed, there would be no reason for the language in Addendum No. 2 regarding what to do in
case of a “conflict with any provisions of [Original PSA].” That same language in Addendum
No. 2 already says in case of a “modification” Addendum No. 2 controls, which would catch the
situation of an express change in Addendum No. 2 to a specific numbered provision of the
Original RE-23 Form PSA. The Addendum No. 2 “conflict” language is designed to catch the
fundamental core changes wrought by Addendum No. 2 that ripple through and conflict with
multiple portions of the Original RE-23 Form PSA. Addendum No. 2’s language that the
Earnest Money will become nonrefundable if Buyer fails “to terminate this agreement by the
Due Diligence Deadline for any reason” is exactly this type of change that ripples through and
conflicts with multiple portions of the Original RE-23 Form PSA, including most notably
Sections 12 and 29, but also to every other time the Earnest Money deposit was mentioned as
potentially refundable to Buyer in that Original RE-23 Form PSA.
Thus, as of the Due Diligence Deadline, the Earnest Money becomes non-refundable to
Buyer if Buyer had not terminated the agreement for any reason (although a credit for the
amount of the Earnest Money still is applicable to the Purchase Price at closing). The PSA
clearly informs the Buyer that if they go past that Due Diligence Deadline, no excuse whatever
will justify a return of the Earnest Money deposit. Indeed, Addendum No. 2 also adds in the
word “deposit” to the definition of “Earnest Money.” This is significant, as:
Black's refers to a deposit as “[m]oney placed with a person as
earnest money or security for the performance of a contract.”
Black's Law Dictionary 471 (8th ed. 2004). Webster's Second
referred to a deposit as, among other things, an amount given as
earnest money or forfeit. Webster's Second Int'l Dictionary 702
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(1958). Webster's Third says the same, but adds that it can also be
a "partial and first payment on account of the purchase price of
property." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 605 (1986). And
still another definition is to "give a sum of money as part payment
or security." Encarta World English Dictionary 485 (1999).

In re Salazar, 430 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Thus, Addendum No. 2
introduced the concept that the "deposit" would cease to exist and disappear when the Earnest
Money was released to Seller. The title company that was to hold the Earnest Money deposit
literally would tum that money over to Seller and the "deposit" as such would cease to exist.
This was a fact that River Range recognized by giving instruction on February 22, 2018, to the
title insurance company that River Range had "waive[d] Due Diligence as per the Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) and Addenda, dated January 24th, 2018," and "authorize[d]
the Title Company to release the Earnest Money deposit in the amount of $50,000 to Seller."38
Thus, there is no ambiguity in what changes Addendum No. 2 effected as to the Earnest
Money deposit and its non-refundability on a date certain, nor was there any ambiguity in what
to do under the PSA with respect to conflicts between Addendum No. 2 and the Original RE-23
Form PSA's provisions on the return of Earnest Money.

After the expiration of the Due

Diligence Period, the Earnest Money deposit was released to Seller, became non-refundable and
otherwise ceased to exist.

38

R. 000089, ,r 2; R. 000093; see also R. 000007, ,r 9 (emphasis added).
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C.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Appellant Waived Its Right to
Terminate the Purchase and Additional Undisputed Facts Not Cited by the District
Court Support a Waiver
River Range argues that the trial court erred by determining that River Range waived its

right to terminate the purchase due to late receipt of the preliminary title commitment when it did
not exercise its termination right by February 21, 2018. The District Court's holding in this
respect was as follows:
[T]o the extent that Section 12 of the initial contract provided the
earnest money could be returned after the Due Diligence Deadline
if Buyer was not satisfied with the preliminary title commitment or
Seller's attempt to cure a defect was superseded by Addendum No.
2. Addendum No. 2 stated "time of the essence" and then listed
the critical deadlines. River Range does not claim a breach of the
contract due to the late receipt of the preliminary title commitment.
Therefore, River Range waived its right to terminate the purchase
due to the late receipt of the preliminary title commitment when it
did not exercise its termination right by February 21, 2018. 39
This is the sole mention of "waiver" in the District Court's Memorandum Decision. Citadel
submits that it is a correct application of the doctrine and of Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura Ltd., Co.,
138 Idaho 238, 61 P.3d 594 (2002). Incidentally, Steiner was cited by the District Court in
support of its position. In the Steiner case, the sellers were obligated to use efforts to clean up
property by a date certain (90 days after contract signing).

Whether the property was

successfully cleaned up was conditioned upon "[b ]uyer's satisfaction." That date came and went
without cleanup even commencing. Cleanup finally began three months after that date, and only
ten days before the scheduled closing. The sellers at that point unsuccessfully attempted to

39

R. 000197-198 (emphasis added).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18

contact the buyer in order for the buyer to approve the condition of the property. After that the
sellers’ tendered the earnest money back to the buyer who refused it and filed a complaint
seeking specific performance, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, much like the case here. Although the Steiner court did remand the case to
the district court for a factual dispute over the reasonableness of late cleanup efforts, the court
held that the failure to timely object made the passage of the deadline for cleanup alone
insufficient for a breach of contract, saying:
There were some discussions and meetings between the parties as
to the cleanup but no demands for the completion were made at the
end of the 90-day period. Steiner did not formally complain about
the cleanup process until his letter dated June 8, 2000, over two
months after the 90-day period had ended. It appears that the
parties disregarded the March 28, 2000, deadline and the
passage of that deadline alone is insufficient for a breach of
contract.
Id. at 243, 61 P.3d at 600 (emphasis added).
In the present case, after the tardy delivery of the title insurance commitment, River
Range simply proceeded forward to allow the non-refundable release of the Earnest Money
deposit, knowing that it was giving up its recourse under Section 12 to the Earnest Money
deposit because there was no longer any such deposit. That is the only inference that can be
drawn from River Range’s actions in (1) first trying to send a proposed Addendum No. 3 (which
included a carve-out for Section 12 from the operation of the non-refundability of the release of
the Earnest Money deposit); but then (2) upon rejection of Addendum No. 3, immediately
following up with a waiver and release of the Earnest Money deposit in writing. After that,
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River Range sent in its objections to the title insurance commitment on the 15 th business day
after it received its commitment, again confirming that it was disregarding the non-compliance
with the original deadline for the title insurance commitment. Thus, the District Court was
entirely correct to find no issue of material fact that that ability on the part of River Range to
demand timely delivery of the title insurance commitment had been waived, as River Range
proceeded forward with the PSA as if the late delivery did not matter.
Out of an abundance of caution, Citadel has listed as an additional issue on appeal the
facts of River Range making the rejected offer of Addendum No. 3 and the follow up letter to the
title insurance company instructing that the Earnest Money deposit should be released to Seller
are facts that demand a finding of an express waiver by River Range of any right to the Earnest
Money deposit. Citadel argued in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment40 that the
February 22, 2018, letter from River Range to the title company was an express waiver of any
right to return of the earnest money. That letter stated "Buyer, River Range, LLC, hereby waives
Due Diligence .... " and goes on to say that "River Range, LLC authorizes the Title Company to
release the Earnest Money Deposit in the amount of $50,000 to Seller upon receipt of this
notice." 41 By taking such action, and referring to release of its earnest money "deposit", there is
no dispute of fact that River Range met the black letter language of a waiver, i.e., "[a] waiver is
the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act and implies election by a
party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or advantage which he might

40
41

R. 000035-36.
R. 000093.
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at his option have demanded and insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 368, 304
P.2d 646, 649 (1956); see also IDJI 6.24.1 ("Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known
right and may be evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence.") (citing Dennett v.
Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (1997)). It is also important to note that, unlike a waiver

implied by estoppel, an express or "a true waiver", implied from a party's conduct, is dependent
solely on what the party charged with waiver intended to do, and there is no need to show
reliance by the party asserting or claiming the waiver." 13 Williston on Contracts, Section 39:28
(4 th Ed. May 2017 update). Also compare IDJI 6.24.1 ("waiver" defined with no mention of
"reliance" element) to IDJI 6.22.2 ("waiver by estoppel" defined to include reliance as its
element). Thus, whether viewed as an additional issue on appeal, or simply additional factual
support for the District Court's determination that no genuine issue of material fact precluded
judgment that waiver had occurred, the fact of River Range's sending the letter directing that the
Earnest Money Deposit be released and the language of waiver amounts to an express waiver on
the date of the Due Diligence Deadline of any right to get the Earnest Money back in the future.
That is, after all, the natural consequence of releasing a deposit.
River Range argues that at the time the letter was sent releasing the Earnest Money
Deposit, there still was an intent on the part of River Range to flush out the title commitment
issues, which it had in its possession at that point, but had not reached the deadline. However,
the subjective intent of a party cannot override the plain meaning of the language of the contract.
Phillips v. Gomez, 162 Idaho 803, 808, 405 P.3d 588, 593 (2017) ("a party's subjective intent is

immaterial to the interpretation of the contract. Instead, courts will give full force and effect to
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the words of the contract without regard to what the parties of the contract thought it meant or
what they actually intended it to mean.") (citations omitted). However, even if the subjective
intent mattered, clear and unrefuted evidence of a contrary intent was offered on summary
judgment. The fact that River Range knew exactly what it was doing in making that waiver is
drilled home by the sending by River Range of the proposed (and rejected) Addendum No. 3 on
February 21, 2019 (right before that letter) in which River Range sought to extend Section 12 of
the Agreement beyond the due diligence date. 42 Once River Range knew that Citadel was not
going to agree to such extension, River Range in that February 22, 2018, letter still deliberately
released the earnest money and said it "hereby waives Due Diligence as per the Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement .... " A conclusory and unsubstantiated allegation in a brief need
not be credited for purposes of summary judgment.
D.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Respondent Did Not Breach Its Duty
under the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Addendum No. 2 and its modification to Section 29 also precludes the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing from being applied in the manner suggested by River Range. In
that modified language, it is provided that return of the Earnest Money Deposit along with
reimbursement for a number of other minor costs, none of which were sought by the Complaint,
is Buyer's "sole and exclusive remedy for Seller's failure to consummate the sale as herein
agreed." 43 By so providing, in conjunction with the language added by Addendum No. 2 to
Section 4 regarding the Earnest Money becoming nonrefundable upon the expiration of the Due
42
43

R. 000073.
R. 000068, ,r 15 (emphasis added).
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Diligence Deadline, Buyer knowingly agreed under the plain language of the Agreement to limit
its remedy to those other costs. The "deposit" that was the Earnest Money disappeared upon its
release to Seller and simply no longer existed to be returned. The Buyer River Range is simply
asking for a remedy that is precluded, i.e., the return of a "deposit", by the plain language of the
Agreement as the deposit no longer exists, but has been released by virtue of the Buyer's
direction upon the Due Diligence Deadline expiring.
The Idaho Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Johnson v. Lambros, 143
Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). There, the Court of Appeals upheld the District
Court's conclusion denying specific performance of the contract and damages of $65,000 for
additional tax liability over a failed 1031 exchange which did not occur for the buyer by
concluding that the sale agreement and addenda "did not include a promise by Lambros to clear
title but, rather, gave Johnson the right to a refund of his earnest money, as his sole remedy, if
Lambros could not deliver title satisfactory to Johnson." Johnson, 143 Idaho at 471, 147 P.3d at
103. This case would take the ruling one step further, and show in the situation where the
addendum had circumscribed the remaining available remedy down to just a number of
additional costs set out in Section 29, as "Buyer's sole and exclusive remedy" 44 and after the
expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, limited to Seller paying "for the costs of title
insurance, escrow fees, credit report fees, inspection fees, Brokerage fees and attorney's fees, if
any."45 As argued above, the language of paragraph 29 of the PSA that was inconsistent with

44
45

R. 000068, ,r 15.
R. 000055, ,r 22.
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Addendum No. 2 language regarding the non-refundability of the Earnest Money after the Due
Diligence Deadline simply disappears and is written out of that document after that date. In
other words, there was no Earnest Money Deposit after that date to be returned or paid back to
River Range, that deposit had been released.
River Range makes other claims as well that the District Court erred in concluding that
no genuine issue of material fact precluded judgment on its breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim. Specifically, River Range claims that "Citadel was aware of
the title defects and did not disclose them to River Range during negotiations; Citadel did not
timely provide the preliminary title commitment to River Range for its review; Citadel gave the
impression it was willing to attempt to resolve the title issues, River Range relied on such
impression in spending money in pursuit of the negotiations; and that Citadel made no attempt to
resolve the unresolved issues." 46 River Range concedes that "[n]o covenant will be implied
which is contrary to the terms of the Agreement negotiated and executed by the parties."47
As to the first argument that there was an intentional delay, even if this was in fact the
case-a point which is adamantly denied, as delivery of the title insurance commitment was
within the control of the title company, not the Seller-nevertheless that is not a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Steiner case cited elsewhere shows that a
particular deadline for the benefit of one party may be waived by the other party proceeding
forward despite the late occurrence of that particular deadline.
46

Having waived an express

Opening Brief, p. 13.
Opening Brief, p. 14, citing First Sec. Bank of v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d 683,
687 (1998).

47
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deadline under the Agreement for delivery of the title insurance commitment, accepting late
delivery of that document, and then still proceeding forward with objections to that document as
per the process outlined under the Agreement, River Range cannot go back and recast history.
River Range cannot now say that the passage of that very deadline was somehow the basis of a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is tantamount to going against
the express language of the Agreement at that point. See, e.g., Bakker v. Thunder Spring
Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 (2005) (where employment contract required that
sale had to close before termination of employment in order for employee to be due a
commission, employee had no “legal claim to the commission” and therefore no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim either).

The notion that Citadel gave the

impression that it was willing to attempt to resolve the title issues, that River Range relied on
such impression, spending money in pursuit of negotiations, and that Citadel then made no
attempt to resolve the allegedly undisclosed issues it knew of, falls prey to the express language
of the PSA to the contrary. Beginning with the “as-is” clause and ending up in the quality of title
to be conveyed by deed as not requiring any such conduct on the part of the seller:
PROPERTY SOLD AS-IS. Buyer acknowledges that Buyer is
authorized to conduct any investigations with respect to the
Property’s merchantability, condition, suitability, fitness for a
particular purpose, habitability, environmental condition and legal
compliance. Buyer acknowledges that Buyer is acquiring the
Property in its current condition, as is, where is, in reliance solely
on Buyer’s own inspection and [except as to some very limited
warranties by Seller found in Section 18], not in reliance on any
statement, representation, warranty, promise or agreement of
any kind whatsoever by Seller, any broker or any agent or
representative of either. Buyer acknowledges that no statement
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by Seller, any broker or any agent or representative of either is
intended to be relied upon. 48

Immediately before the oral argument in this matter, counsel for River Range alerted
counsel for Citadel for the first time that River Range intended to cite Johnson v. Lambros,
supra, to the Court in support of its breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

There, the Johnson court focused on the fact that the contract at issue said "[t ]itle of SELLER is
to be conveyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be marketable and
insurable . . . No Liens, encumbrances or defects, which are to be discharged or assumed by
BUYER or to which title is taken subject to, exist unless otherwise specified in this agreement."
Id. at 470, 147 P.3d at 102. However, in Addendum No. 2 in this case, the quality of title to be

conveyed in the present case is as follows:
Title of SELLER is to be conveyed by customary special warranty
deed conveying all of Seller's right, title and interest in the
Property free and clear of any encumbrances arising by or through
Seller except real property taxes and assessments not yet due and
payable. 49
This deed is materially different and does not impose upon Citadel as Seller a blanket duty to
convey marketable title, but only a duty to convey title that is free and clear of any encumbrances
created by Seller. When this provision is read in conjunction with paragraph 12 of the PSA, it
becomes clear that Seller has no affirmative duty to convey marketable title, but that title is a
take it or leave it proposition. The Buyer gives notice of disapproved items and it is up to
Seller's discretion to try to rectify those exceptions or do nothing. Thus, any implied duty to
48
49

R. 000068, ,r 11.
R. 000067, ,r 2.
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convey title would be circumscribed to such conveyances to at most a duty to clear
encumbrances arising by or through seller.

The District Court appropriately applied this

language and the option not to proceed with the transaction under Section 12 that River Range
had at all times to conclude in the first instance that "Citadel had no obligation to agree to
resolve to River Range's satisfaction any title issues," and that "[t]his is not a breach of the
covenant of good faith, as the Contract never required Citadel to agree to River Range's
objection to the preliminary title report. Failure to agree to the requested clarifications on title

°

merely gave River Range the right to terminate the transaction." 5 Citadel thinks that this ruling
is proper and also agrees with the District Court's going on to state "even assuming Citadel may
have indicated a willingness to work with River Range on some title concerns, Addendum No. 2
expressly set forth the type of title Citadel was agreeing to provide was a customary special
warranty deed which was 'free and clear of any encumbrances arising by or through Seller
except real property taxes and assessments not yet due and payable.' . . . Plaintiff has failed to
provide evidence to establish the title concerns raised and allegedly not addressed by Citadel
arose [are] those 'by or through Seller."' 51
Thus, although it did not mention the case by name 52 the District Court did go through
the analysis and determined that applying the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
indicate some affirmative requirement on the part of Seller under this PSA, ran contrary to the

50

R. 000225.
R. 000225.
52
Although it was addressed in oral argument, see Tr. 23, 11. 3-16.
51
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express language of the quality of title to be conveyed and the remedies afforded with respect to
conditions illuminated by the title commitment.
E.

Citadel Was Properly Awarded Attorneys’ Fees and Citadel is Entitled to its Costs
and Attorney Fees on Appeal.
River Range’s argument that the award of attorneys’ fees below should be reserved is

entirely premised upon the assumption that River Range should prevail in this appeal. Citadel
disagrees with that assumption (and if that turns out to be the case, the award of fees below
should stand as otherwise unchallenged by River Range), but in the event that River Range
should prevail and the district court decision is vacated and remanded, Citadel would concede
that vacation of an award of attorneys’ fees based on Memorandum Decision would be
appropriate as Citadel would cease to be the prevailing party under I.R.C.P. 54 as to the case
below and that Memorandum Decision.
On the other hand, Citadel, if it prevails in this appeal, is entitled to additional costs
pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 12-120(3) as well as under the RE-23
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement at Section 31 incurred on
appeal.
“Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil
action to recover on ‘any commercial transaction.’ Commercial transactions are all transactions
except for personal or household purposes.” De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho
557, 567, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014). Where a commercial transaction is the “gravamen of the
lawsuit,” I.C. § 12-120(3) “compels” an award of attorney fees and costs. See e.g. Edged In
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Stone, Inc. v. Northwest Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176,181,321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014). In
Goodman, the Court equated the gravamen issue to a "but for cause" analysis, stating that
without the underlying commercial transaction, "the lawsuit would not have been brought."
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 592, 226 P.3d 530, 534
(2010). In this case, Citadel is entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) because
River Range's claims in this lawsuit arise out of a commercial transaction and such commercial
transaction is in the very title of the document that comprises the agreement at the heart of this
action, i.e., "RE-23 Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement." 53 See
also, Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 168-69, 335 P.3d 1, 13-14 (2014) ("The Browns
request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate
Rule 41 because the sale of the property was a commercial transaction. The Browns also request
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the purchase and sale agreement. As
discussed, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) is applicable because the land transaction was entered
into by Greenheart and the Browns for a commercial purpose.").
Further that RE-23 Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement
provides at Paragraph 31 that "[i]f either party initiates or defends any ... legal action or
proceedings which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees, including
such costs and fees on appeal." 54 Thus, by agreement, the prevailing party in this litigation is

53
54

R. 000051 (emphasis added).
R. 000055.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 29

entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees. If Citadel prevails, that will bring this litigation
to an end, and it may appropriately be deemed that prevailing party. A contractual award of fees
would thus be appropriate.

V.

CONCLUSION

Citadel respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of October, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Isl Thomas E. Dvorak
Thomas E. Dvorak
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent Citadel
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